more fully developed. 7 However, this short piece 8 serves to provide a bridge between the dissertation and the rest of my international law life. It is an effort to elaborate a little on the intuition I have had for a couple of years, that reading Hammarskjöld would be relevant to the future of neutrality, and of international law. 9 I will begin by briefly touching upon a few samples of neutrality discourse around the turn of the millennium (thus picking up where I left off in my thesis), then bring in Hammarskjöld and with him as a springboard analyse the concept of neutrality and give some hints of what might be its role in the future. I shall move from traditional neutrality in war to humanitarian affairs, to the international civil service to peacekeeping and then back to the position of third states in a war, before my argument ends in the field of professional ethics.
Neutrality Today
The law of neutrality is no longer spoken of very often. One author even asks, in his heading, "[i]s neutrality a really dead concept?" (he answers negatively), and notes that "neutrality has almost disappeared as a research object in international relations in this high time of norms, values, and identity". 10 But the continued validity and relevancealbeit limited -of the law of neutrality is still recognised.
11
However, as implied, what interests me here -both intellectually and pragmatically -is the employment of neutrality in other, though related contexts, namely humanitarian affairs, international civil service and peacekeeping. Neutrality has been in these contexts for a long time, 12 but the discussion has taken on a particular relevance after the end of the Cold War. While neutrality for third states may be ignored as a legal regime (most states can ignore most armed conflicts most of the time), neutrality in the other three contexts is something that each actor has to take a stand on constantly.
What then does neutrality entail? Neutrality in traditional international law, in the context of international armed conflict, was a combination of abstention and impartiality, with the latter basically meaning equal treatment. Equality in treatment related foremost to those factors relevant to the licensing of arms export, while it was generally held to be less important if one party or the other was favoured in various Which, in fact, was in principle conceptualised even before the dissertation defence. 9
That was not my original notion, of course. See infra note 28, which refers to Theo van Boven. 10 L. Goetschel, 'Neutrality, a Really Dead Concept? ', 34 Cooperation and Conflict (1999) pp. 115-139, p. 132. 11 See infra, section 2.4. 12 As far as the ICRC is concerned, it goes back to the very start. G. Best, War and Law Since 1945 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) p. 374.
other ways by the neutral government. 13 In the context of humanitarian operations, as well as that of civil service and peace operations, neutrality has the broader meaning of 'not taking sides in the conflict', as will be developed below. Neutrality within this understanding, however, does not exclude judgments on issues that are within the mandate of the respective organisation (the UN, the ICRC, etc), as we shall see.
Humanitarian Affairs
Humanitarian assistance is firmly linked to the law of neutrality. There are provisions within the 1949 Geneva Conventions as well as in the 1977 First Additional Protocol, which pertain to neutrality and humanitarian assistance.
14 These provisions invest neutrality with a valuable role and they provide a good political argument for state neutrality. Further, they offer a space where actions are non-political; humanitarian aid should never be regarded as being interference in an armed conflict. As we shall note later, the permanent neutrals have often justified their position with this link, Switzerland also by being the host of the ICRC.
But neutrality has a further specific 'humanitarian' meaning as one of the three main principles of the Red Cross. 15 The ICRC seems to apply the word 'neutrality' to cover mainly abstention from involvement in a dispute. It is defined thus: "In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature." It is further explained as being abstention from "acting in a way that could facilitate the conduct of hostilities by any of the parties involved". 16 Neutrality is the basis for humanitarian assistance, and the Red Cross does not in fact take a position with regard to the causes of a conflict.
17
Beside this principle of neutrality (leaning towards abstention) there is the principle of impartiality, which the ICRC explains thus: "It endeavours to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by their needs [and] relates to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, disbursed only on the basis of the needs of the recipients. All humans, though not in comparable circumstances, have the same rights.
19 Both neutrality and impartiality imply an absence of the taking of sides, but they have different addressees -neutrality towards the belligerents, impartiality towards the victims. 20 However, impartiality also refers to the state of mind of someone making a judgment, and impartiality in ICRC doctrine covers this notion: "In other words, impartiality implies the objective scrutiny of problems and the 'depersonalization' of humanitarian work."
21
According to Maurice Torrelli, the policy ('politique') of neutrality takes precedence over impartiality, because in order to fulfil its mission the ICRC has to retain the confidence of the parties, and therefore it cannot complain of breaches of humanitarian law. 22 It is neutrality as a principle, which permits the Red Cross movement to be universal. 23 However, 'the second generation' of humanitarian organisations, such as Médecins sans frontières and others, who 'pretend' to also pose as proponents of human rights, have abandoned this strict conception of neutrality and denounce violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. 24 A recent survey of humanitarian relief organisations in the United Kingdom revealed that neutrality has become something of a 'dirty word'. 25 The ICRC has therefore felt obliged to explain itself. As Pierre Krahenbühl notes, "[n]ot taking sides in a conflict does not mean being indifferent. The ICRC is not neutral in the face of violations of international humanitarian law … It strives to ensure that all those taking part in the hostilities respect humanitarian law. Neutrality is therefore a means to an end, not an end in itself." 26 And there are some actions towards which the ICRC cannot be neutral. In 1996, when the Fundamental Principles were last revised, the ICRC stated that it does make "public representations" "when it observes grave and repeated breaches of international humanitarian law [and] its confidential representations have been in vain and it considers that the only means of helping the victims is to ask for the support of the international community". 27 19 As Torrelli explains, in distinction to the principled abstention "inherent in neutrality", impartiality (in the supply of assistance) is relative and dependent on the circumstances. 
Peace Operations
The neutrality or impartiality of the Secretary-General was linked to the concept of neutrality of states in the sense that it was held to be useful or even necessary to have a Secretary-General from a neutral or non-aligned state (Sweden for Hammarskjöld, Burma for U Thant and Austria in the case of Kurt Waldheim). 31 Closely related to that was the concept of peacekeeping, developed by Hammarskjöld; it was an extension of the neutrality of the organisation as such, but also an activity particularly amenable to neutral countries, as will be discussed further in the next section. Ambassador Marianne von Grünigen of Switzerland explained this link in the 1970s: "To be compatible with the status of neutrality, peace-keeping operations must comply with certain conditions in order to guarantee that they do not bear any coercive elements. The most important conditions are the consent of the host State, the impartial function of the Force and the prohibition of coercive actions."
32 Above all, she emphasised, the force must "behave in such a way as not to take part in a conflict, which means that it must itself be of a neutral character". 33 However, after the experiences of the 1990s, the concept of neutrality was excluded from the doctrine of peacekeeping. Kofi Annan observed that the United Nations had "learned that while impartiality is a vital condition for peacekeeping, it must be impartiality in the execution of the mandate -not just an unthinking neutrality between warring parties". 34 And the Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations concluded in 2000 that "[i]mpartiality for such operations must therefore mean adherence to the principles of the Charter and to the objectives of a mandate that is rooted in those Charter principles. Such impartiality is not the same as neutrality or equal treatment of all parties in all cases for all time, which can amount to a policy of appeasement".
35 Dominick Donald explains that an "impartial entity is active, its actions independent of the parties to a conflict, based on a judgement of the situation; it is fair and just in its treatment of the parties while not taking sides. A neutral is much more passive; its limited actions are within restrictions imposed by the belligerents". 36 In this context 'impartiality' is different from its traditional meaning of 'equal treatment', but there is still a connection. Equal treatment means treatment equal under a certain regime, and in the context of the traditional law of neutrality the regime in question is usually a national export regime, in the context of humanitarian operations the relevant regime is the criteria for delivery and in peace operations it is the UN Charter and the mandate of the operation. 36 Donald, supra note 34, p. 22. Baros, too, distinguishes between neutrality and impartiality:
"[L]osing neutrality does not necessarily imply becoming partial in a certain conflict situation." "[N]eutrality implies a lack of support for one side in a conflict, which is an externally observable phenomenon, while someone's impartiality means the 'ability to act fairly because they are not personally involved in a situation'." M. Baros, 'The UN's Response to ity' has been disconnected from 'impartiality' and has disappeared from the vocabulary of peacekeeping in both the Security Council and the General Assembly, 37 and this "certainly represents progress". 38 As one UN official put it: "After the Safe Havens, neutrality is a four-letter word …" 39
Neutrality of States
So, we have talked about neutrality in humanitarian assistance, in international civil service and in peacekeeping, and have noted that impartiality seemed to be the favoured concept (even the ICRC conception of neutrality appeared to boil down to something similar to the impartiality practised in civil service and peacekeeping.) What of the traditional law of neutrality between states? von Heinegg confirms the continued validity of the law of maritime neutrality, in particular as updated in the San Remo Manual and the Helsinki Principles on the Law of Maritime Neutrality. 40 This law is applicable to "every international armed conflict at sea, at least insofar as the belligerents are taking measures affecting the shipping (and aviation) of third states". 41 However, the scope of application, and perhaps also the content of the law, has been modified by the provisions of collective security. von Heinegg continues: "In view of the primary responsibility of the Security Council for international peace and security, in such a situation [where the Council has taken action under Chapter VII] there is no room for … neutrality."
42 Furthermore, after the post-Cold War triumph of the restricted interpretation of neutral duties in trade (only as regards governmental exports) and the willingness of states such as Switzerland to participate in sanctions, the law of neutrality seems to have been reduced to a bare minimum of abstention from military measures. 43 Nevertheless, this does not mean that neutrality has lost all importance. As Goetschel puts it, in former times the most important realistic political function of neutrality was "to guarantee a country's political independence … to enable a country to maintain its basic trade relationships … [and to contribute to domestic] political cohesion". 44 In addition, neutrality served the general interest in containment. However, more interestingly for the purposes of my discussion, "neutrality also has an idealistic side … Neutral states were … subject to internal and external pressure to justify their policy … by some other fundamentals or ideas of 'grandness'." 45 Consequently, "[n]eutral states have always tried to underline their policy's usefulness for the international system". 46 It is obvious that this connects neutrality in armed conflict to humanitarian assistance, the international civil service and peacekeeping. von Grünigen explained that "Secretary-General … Dag Hammarskjold … designed [peacekeeping] in such a manner as to induce the cooperation and participation of neutral States, thereby giving a new importance to permanent neutrality", 47 and she and other representatives of neutral countries have never tired of pointing out that neutrality may usefully lead to humanitarian action, good offices or mediation. 48 This 'idealistic' role used to be a by-product or an argument for the legitimacy of neutrality, but not the core of the concept. However, as Torrelli expressed it, as policy, permanent neutrality has developed from the principle of abstention to become "a principle of action envisaged to construct peace", and impartiality is "manifested" as "universality". 49 Goetschel finds that while the "role conceptions of neutral states linked to their non-participation in a military conflict (realistic roles) have lost their significance", 50 the "idealistic" "roles and functions of neutrality may have become even more important on a concrete policy level than they were in the past". requires an active promotion of peaceful relations and not "passive contemplation of injustice, violence, and oppression". 52 Switzerland, the arch-neutral, has revised its understanding of its role: There can be no neutrality between the community of states -or "the international community acting as a single entity" -and a state that severely disregards the international legal order. 53 For Switzerland, the participation in such measures is a matter of both the protection of its interests and the obligations of solidarity. 54 
Summary
Hammarskjöld's neutrality does not demand total indifference or inactivity, it only demands indifference towards that which is not relevant to the purpose of the organisation. In other words: the impartial civil servant, like the judge, shall be indifferent to all circumstances not relevant from the point of view of his official aims and purposes, be it to maintain peace or to uphold the law. Applied to humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping, the terms of the debate could thus be cast as a question of which factors should be relevant and which should not -that is, as a matter of impartiality. And, in such a discussion the distinction between, say, the ICRC and Médecins sans frontières or the UN would be one of focus rather than of kind -impartial in relation to whom and to what factors?
Some may ask if discourse on the principled role of the UN Secretary-General, peacekeepers and the ICRC is really relevant for states. However, there is no reason why Members of the Security Council -or, for that matter, the General Assemblyshould be any less guided by the Charter than should the Secretary-General. There is no bar to transposing the guiding principles (or ethics; see infra) of an international institution to the plane of sovereigns. As I shall argue in the next section, governments are organs of the international society no less than the Secretary-General, and neutral -or ex-neutral' -governments have often acted as if they were just that (though not necessarily under that conceptual umbrella).
The Future

States as Upholders of International Law
What does this discussion on different conceptions of impartiality have to do with upholding international law? As Hedley Bull asserts, order in international society 52 Goetschel, supra note 10, p. neutral') countries is doubtful, but that is not necessary for the normative argument of this article.
builds on "a sense of common interests in the elementary goals of social life", and for that rules provide the guidance. 55 However, since an aggrieved state is often not in a position to effectively defend its right, the enforcement of the rules is uncertain.
56 I would like to relate this predicament to Georges Scelle's notion of dédoublement fonctionnel -that state organs (and the individuals managing them) have double functions, namely as organs of two or more societies, for instance where a national Parliament, which approves a treaty, thereby legislates not only for the national but also for the international society. This entails that national government participate in the administration of international society.
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That notion could also perhaps be detected in Hammarskjöld's thinking. 58 In his annual report of 1960, he wrote that "[t]he United Nations is an organic creation of the political situation facing our Generation. At the same time, however, the international community has, so to say, come to political self-consciousness in the Organisation". 59 He even spoke of "international constitutional law", which is still in "an embryonic stage". 60 The word 'constitutional', as employed by Hammarskjöld occasions, stands for the existence of a constitution that provides "organs with different functions and a division of responsibilities representing a balance of power". 61 Under a domestic constitution, there are institutions tasked with applying and upholding the law. In the international system, common institutions have a much smaller role.
As far as can be ascertained, Hammarskjöld never said explicitly that governments have roles as organs of the international community, but I believe that he did hold that states have responsibilities to uphold international law. He often expressed the view that the processes of law and the principles of justice were necessary for a secure and decent international order. 62 Now, according to traditional international legal doctrine, "the victim, and nobody but the victim, of a violation of the law has the right to enforce the law against the violator. Nobody at all has the obligation to enforce it". 63 However, that is changing. Like many others, Erika de Wet has noted the role that international law has given to states in the enforcement of its basic rules. The ICJ determined in the Barcelona Traction case of 1970 that some obligations are the concern of all states (erga omnes), and that all states can be held to have a legal interest in the protection of the corresponding rights. 64 Furthermore, Article 48 of the Articles on State Responsibility 65 gives individual states a role in enforcing "the international value system" by entitling states other than directly injured states to invoke responsibility in such cases. The Articles thus enable states to "complement in a decentralized fashion the existing, institutionalised mechanisms for enforcement of the core values of the international legal order". 68 To that could be added treaty provisions such as common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions ("… undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances"), Article 89 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions ("[i]n situations of serious violations … undertake to act jointly or individually …"), the preambular provisions in the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court ("… their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation … [r]ecalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes") and Article 56 of the UN Charter ("[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of [respect for human rights]". And so on. These expressions both reflect and support a tendency for third states to enforce rules of international law, through decentralised and centralised (UN Security Council) collective countermeasures. 69 As Pierre-Marie Dupuy notes, this fits well with Scelle's scheme. fundamental rules invoked by the above-mentioned quotes. However, even though far from being uncontroversial as a legal proposition, it could still be a guiding principle as a moral imperative or as a political maxim, or both, at least when it comes to what Andreas Paulus has termed "the international 'public' law". 71 If so -and I think it should be so -to where would it lead?
Impartiality
As I discussed in my thesis, there are many conceptions of neutrality as an abstract idea, and, as has been more than implied supra, the most interesting one for the purposes of this discussion is neutrality as impartiality, or as objectivity on the basis of a recognised norm. This is the neutrality of a judge, so long as that judge adheres to a substantively determined law 72 (a figure that Hammarskjöld also referred to 73 ), or to that of an international body, such as the Security Council, if it acts according to rules and principles, rather than caprice.
74
Impartiality does not exclude action -on the contrary. However, any action by an impartial is based upon an assessment of the facts in the light of norms (be they legal rules or moral principles), and not with regard to the identity of the parties. That means that the impartial should be committed to principles. 75 This also means that while one should be impartial as to interests as such, after an analysis it may emerge that some interests are protected or even promoted on principle (such as the interests of a civilian population in an armed conflict), whereas other interests would be rejected on principle.
Consequently, impartiality should lead to abstention a priori, that is, before and at the time of the outbreak of the conflict in question, before one knows who is in the right. 76 A posteriori, by contrast, a position may well be taken -and perhaps should be (if there is a violation of a jus cogens norm of the "international 'public' law"). he superpower sees the UN as relevant only when it consents, while the UN security requirements imply neutrality in the sense of freedom from partial interests". Falkman, supra note 5, p. 36. Nevertheless, the Council sometimes does act in a principled manner in a credible common interest, as in the rightly celebrated resolutions 1325 and 1612 on women, peace and security and on children in armed conflict, respectively. 75 There is, however, no impartiality between principles, although there might be a need for balancing and pragmatism. 76 For some states it might be difficult to exercise impartiality, because they are tied up with one of the parties in an alliance. Cf. the US distinction between friends and allies. A friend is someone who shares your values, while an ally is someone who shares a certain goal.
tion might be to support one of the parties morally or materially, or to be more or less neutral (abstention and equal treatment). 77 For certain, once a decision has been taken to participate with economic, political, military or other means, the ensuing engagement may necessitate a measure of compromise, because of the need to be loyal to or coordinate with other members of a coalition. Nevertheless, even the participant in a coalition must allow a state to impartially assess consequential choices, for instance, the selection of targets in a bombing campaign.
For those who think that this sounds unrealistic in an interdependent world, it should be pointed out that this attitude does not preclude membership of a security organisation. Goetschel notes the increasing importance for states to "anchor their norms of behavior in international cooperation mechanisms".
78 Thus, the main task for neutrality today is to exercise its 'beliefs' for all Europe.
79 Indeed, Goetschel asserts that "[n]eutral states are predestined to becoming a credible moral instance of the EU's military crisis management". 80 And Hammarskjöld encourages us to stay independent even as members: "The concept of loyalty is distorted when it is understood to mean blind acceptance. It is correctly interpreted when it is assumed to cover honest criticism", 81 -and honest dissent, I would add. ), there are many situations where international law is silent or of little help. First of all, there are many situations in which international law actually empowers states as members of institutions that have the authority to take decisions that bind or otherwise affect other states in a way beyond the capacities of these member states qua single states. 86 In the situation of an armed conflict, a member of the Security Council has to decide how to vote within the wide -but not unlimited -discretion given by Articles 24, 39-51 and 103. Whether or not that is beneficial and acceptable depends upon whether or not that body acts as an impartial body on the basis of recognised norms.
Basis for Impartial Engagement
87 Secondly, the law may leave a wide margin of appreciation for states in its application, or it may leave states freedom to do what they please within certain limits. Hence, in the absence of a binding decision by an authoritative organ, a state must choose between taking action against an aggressor or staying more or less neutral (support to the aggressor should be out of the question, as provided by law).
One therefore needs to go beyond black-letter law. Hammarskjöld "viewed the body of law not merely as a technical set of rules and procedures, but as the authoritative expression of principles that determine the goals and direction of collective 84 Of course, this is not to say that the rules determine the outcomes in a logical way. By the way, it is not a coincidence that Scelle was particularly interested in the new phenomenon of international supervision by bodies composed of states. The difficult question was to determine when these individuals act in the national or in the common interest. Cassese, supra note 57. action", 88 or some basic rules of international ethics. 89 This body of principles could influence the Security Council even within its discretionary mandate. Furthermore, as already suggested, while there is no hard and fast duty to assist a victim, the erga omnes and jus cogens character of certain norms certainly imply that states have some sort of responsibility to uphold such norms.
However, such a duty must always be weighed against other concerns, and while such a balancing is not an act of mathematics, principles assist. To assert this, however, is just the beginning of the exercise. For instance, if one formulates principles in terms of international responsibility, they might consist of respect for equal rights and legitimate interests of other states -to "act in good faith; observe international law; punish aggressors; observe the laws of war; … and so forth". 90 A cosmopolitan, humanitarian responsibility, by contrast, might provide that "statesmen first and foremost are human beings and as such they have a fundamental obligation not only to respect but also to defend human rights around the world". 91 While an internationalist, and probably also a cosmopolitan, might say, as does Charles Kegley, that "[i]ndividual interest cannot prevail over the larger collective good" and that "violators of law's prohibitions against aggression" must be policed, 92 Michael Walzer, the communitarian, reminds us that a decision by a state to engage in war "condemns an indefinite number of its citizens to certain death". 93 Hence, "[t]he same solidarity that makes noninvolvement at home morally questionable may well make it obligatory in the international arena: this group of men and women must save one another's lives first".
I have now left the comparatively safe terrain of international law for that of ethics -international ethics, which is an increasingly popular field. And this brings me to another notion of impartiality, namely that of the philosophical concept of 'moral impartiality', which in essence means that all interests should be accorded equal consideration, including -perhaps -those of the acting agent. This view is in contrast to that which accepts a loyalty to certain people -for instance, the population in the state of the government concerned. 95 This debate can neither be settled nor even begun here. But to show where it might lead, I would suggest that prudence on behalf of one's population in time of danger could be the basis for an acceptable principle, 96 whereas opportunistic deferral to a great power is not. Perhaps, to connect the Genocide judgment to a mild cosmopolitanism, one could at least prescribe the following: "[i]f you are the person in the best position to prevent something really awful, and it won't cost you much to do so, do it". 97 To sum up, to be impartial involves more than just applying the law in good faith -it is to act so that one's actions can be rationalised in terms of universally applicable principles, 98 even beyond the law. And it is more than being 'principled', because the term 'impartiality' implies that the impartial subject is an institution of a society, whose rights and duties are, in fact, exercised by a human being, such as a judge. 99 However, this is not to pretend to give practical advice on what to do in a given 'here and now'. To reason in terms of principles and impartiality can produce a number of different outcomes -some good and some bad. 100 It does not take hegemony out of the picture, nor politics. 101 But neither is it the case that arguments over legal rules or principles are always determined from some other privileged or meta-discourse, such as power or interests. Those are merely other terms, which also participate in discourses about what to do in a 'here and now'. 102 I therefore believe that an impartial reasoning, based upon law and the principles of ethics, will often contribute to other decisions, and sometimes better ones, than does reasoning in terms of power or interests. Concepts do not determine the answers, but they condition the possibilities for certain results -they limit somewhat the horizon of possibilities and increase the likelihood of certain outcomes. Adopting the language of universalisable norms will allow a more open discussion, and will disallow references to 'solidarity' with a certain party without explaining that that party actually is right or invocations of 'the national interest', without asking whether such an interest is justified.
Personal Responsibility?
In public discourse, governments generally do use altruistic or principled terms. My point, though, is that it is also incumbent on the single office holder to positively do this even in the actual deliberations. And this leads me to personal responsibility, indicated by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Scelle holds that the real subjects of international law are individuals, and it is ultimately they who perform the double role, including the upholding of international law. 103 For the officeholder, the office could be a shield from responsibility. But, as I have suggested, the office can also be the mantle that carries responsibility. To me -and I am not unique in this respect -the position of public official is not any less morally relevant than that of a family man, 104 and to say anything else is to start to walk down the road that led to Auschwitz. 105 And that applies to any person serving in an office in any organ playing a part in the international community -whether the legal adviser in a Foreign Ministry, the advocate of an authoritative human rights NGO, or the CEO of a multinational company exercising de facto authority in a failed or corrupt state. (Ove has masterfully played two of these three roles, and has advised holders of the third one.) Is it not, when it comes down to praxis, in the last instance a question of professional ethics? * * * * * Few people have battled so intensively with these issues as did Hammarskjöld. For him, it was all to do with the office and the man or woman -the duties flowing from the office and lying with the incumbent -and the approach to "international life which … is concerned mainly with problems of personal ethics". 106 In his personal diary, later published as Vägmärken (Markings), Hammarskjöld wrote: "You must know life, and be recognised by it, after your measure of transparency -after the measure of your ability to disappear as an end and remain just as a means." 107 As Ove noted, although Hammarskjöld on a general level accepted Kant's postulate that human beings can only be ends, not means, he applied the opposite guidelines for the governance of his own life -"namely by suppressing himself as a subject and striving to function as an object/means to achieve something". 108 I would add that it is only the human subject that can turn itself into a means rather than an end, and perhaps that is exactly what one does in assuming a public office, to the extent demanded by that office. 109 
